LTE Standard Related Patents Landscape 1Q 2017

By exploiting a big data patent search and analysis tool - the IPlytics Platform (Ref. https://www.slideshare.net/alexglee/iplytics-platform-introduction), TechIPm, LLC (www.techipm.com) extends its more than 6 years of custom research of LTE patents to include a large number of new candidates for the LTE standard essential patents (SEPs). The IPlytics Platform data sources cover over 80 million patent documents for 98 worldwide countries, over 60 million scientific articles, information regarding over 3 million companies, about 2 million standards documents from 96 standard setting organizations including over 200,000 SEPs declared at the major standard setting organizations (SSOs).

LTE issued patents for the LTE UE (cellular phones, smart phones, PDAs, mobile PCs, etc.), base station (eNB) products, and other RAN (Radio Access Network) related products are searched in the USPTO as of 1Q 2017.  The searched patents are further reviewed with respect to 3GPP Release 10 technical specifications (LTE-Advanced) for LTE RAN technical specifications: PHY: TS 36.101, 211, 212, 213, 305; L2/L3 Protocols: TS 36.300, 304, 321, 322, 323, 331, 355 and 3GPP Release 11 technical specifications for CoMP (TR 36.819), 3GPP Release 12 technical specifications for EPDCCH (TS 36.211, 213) and D2D (Device to Device; TR 36.843) Communications.

The identified LTE standard related patents cover not only ETSI declared SEPs but also candidates for SEPs that were not declared. Nearly 4000 US issued patents are finally selected as the LTE standard related patents. The identified LTE standard related patents are also updated for the current assignees.

The identified LTE standard related patents are further categorize through the evaluation process by technologies for implementations of the LTE baseband modem ( OFDM/OFDMA (Frame & Slot Structure, Modulation), SC-FDMA (PUSCH, PUCCH), Channel Estimation (UL RS, DL RS, CQI), Cell Search & Connection (PRACH, DL SS), MIMO (Transmit Diversity, Spatial Multiplexing), Resource Management (Resource Allocation, Scheduling), Coding (Convolution, Turbo), Power Control, HARQ, Carrier Aggregation, Relay, and Positioning Technology) and radio protocols (Random Access, HARQ, Channel Prioritization, Scheduling (Dynamic, SPS), Protocol Format (PDUs, SDUs), Radio Link Control (ARQ), PDCP Process (SRB, DRB, ROHC), Security (Ciphering, Integrity), System Information, Connection Control, Mobility (Handover, Inter-RAT, Measurements), QoS, MBMS, and Carrier Aggregation). To evaluate the essentiality of a LTE patent, patent disclosures in claims and detail description for each LTE related patent also are compared to the LTE technical specifications.

Leaders in LTE standard related patents IPR ownership as of 1Q 2107 are Qualcomm followed by InterDigital, Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, Google, Ericsson, Nokia (+ Alcatel-Lucent), Apple, Panasonic, Optis Wireless Technology LLC, Intel, Huawei, NTT Docomo, ZTE, BlackBerry, Amazon, NEC, Texas Instruments, and ETRI. Here, most of Amazon’s LTE patents were acquired from LG Electronics.

For more information, please contact Alex Lee at alexglee@techipm.com .

LTE Patents for Standards Data 2Q 2016

Link: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/lte-patents-standards-data-2q-2016-alex-g-lee-ph-d-j-d-clp?published=t

Huawei v. Samsung 4G LTE Patents for Standard Comparative Analysis

Link: :  https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/huawei-v-samsung-4g-lte-patents-standard-comparative-alex-g-?published=t

LTE Standard Relevant Patents Insights

Link: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/lte-standard-relevant-patents-insights-alex-g-lee-ph-d-j-d-clp?published=t

LTE-based Vehicle and Drone Networks Insights from Patents

Link: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/lte-based-vehicle-drone-networks-insights-from-lee-ph-d-j-d-clp?published=t

LTE Patents Licensing Royalty Issues with Connected Cars

As the connected car market glows, LTE is becoming the main connectivity technology not only for the V2X (vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-person, vehicle-to- roadside unit) communications but also for providing value added services (e.g., infotainment).  For example, the 2015 Audi A3 LTE connectivity service includes navigation with Google Earth and Street View, weather and event information.  Thus, one may expect that the increasing use of LTE can make the automotive sector a new patent dispute battleground.  For potential patent litigation risk regarding LTE, please see Increasing Monetization Activities Exploiting LTE Patents.

          The main issue with the LTE patent dispute will be the reasonable royalty of LTE standard essential patents (SEPs) that can be used for damage evaluation regarding infringing LTE products. SEPs encompass intellectual property rights (IPRs) for the standardized technologies.  Usually, all the essential aspects of standardized technologies are specified in standard specifications. Thus, SEPs can be defined as patents that include one or more claims that are infringed by the implementation of certain standard specifications.  Consequently, any LTE standard-compatible products (e.g., LTE connectivity chipsets) may infringe SEPs.

Standards are often developed and set-up through the standardization process by the standard setting organizations (SSOs).  If the adopted standards are covered by some patents owned by the members that proposed the adopted standards, the members become the patentees of SEPs.  The patentee of SEPs may have market power in the relevant technology market because the industry may be locked-in to using the standard and the value of SEPs becomes significantly enhanced. Thus, the patentee can demand and obtain unreasonably high royalty payments – hold up value - due to very high switching cost to alternative technology the implementer should pay. Thus, the patent hold up occurs when a patentee of SEPs demands unreasonably higher license fees after the standard is widely adopted than could have been obtained before the standard was implemented.

To avoid the patent holdup problem, a majority of the SSOs require that the members participating in the standardization process to agree ex ante to license their SEPs under fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms ex post to any implementers of the standard.  The members’ agreements to license their SEPs under FRAND terms are usually called FRAND commitments.  In general, FRAND commitments are interpreted as enforceable contractual obligations between a member and an SSO.  An implementer of the standard is a third-party beneficiary of FRAND commitments and therefore entitled to a license of SEPs. 

Two important questions about the FRAND commitments are FRAND royalty base and rate.  One may use a royalty base equal to the entire market value of an infringing product if “the patented feature is the basis for consumer demand” for the entire product. If the patented feature is not the basis for consumer demand for the entire product, the royalty base should reflect only the contribution of the patented feature to consumer demand.  Thus, if a product consists of many components, the royalty base can be the market value of the relevant component to consumer demand created by the patented feature.

          In LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 68 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the court ruled that the royalty base can be the smallest saleable component that embodies the patented feature.  By this reasoning, the FRAND royalty base may be the smallest saleable component that embodies the relevant SEPs.  After the FRAND royalty base was determined, a royalty rate for a specific SEP can be calculated by taking account of the economic contribution of the specific SEP to the smallest saleable component that is used in determination of the FRAND royalty base. 

          In Microsoft v. Motorola and Google, D.C. Nos.2:10-cv-01823-JLR; 2:11-cv-00343-JLR (9th Cir. 2015), the court affirmed the lower court ruling in determining the FRAND royalty. The district court provided basic guidelines for assessing FRAND royalty.  The district court devised the guidelines based on the Georgia-Pacific analysis of the reasonable royalty modified to take into account SSOs’ primary goals for requiring FRAND commitments.  The court provided five primary goals for adopting FRAND commitments: 1. Promotion of widespread adoption of SSOs’ standards; 2. Avoidance of patent hold-up; 3. Avoidance of royalty stacking; 4. Creation of valuable standards; 5. Exclusion of hold-up value in the reasonable royalty.  The court, then, modified the Georgia-Pacific factors to account for the five primary goals for requiring FRAND commitments.  The key modification to the Georgia-Pacific factors leads to the reasoning that a royalty in a patent pool for the specific SEPs at issue or comparable licensing transactions as a candidate for the royalty established through negotiation under FRAND commitments. Thus, the royalty rate in the recently formed LTE patent pool may provide expected FRAND licensing revenue.

          Another court’s guidelines for assessing FRAND royalty for SEPs can be found in In re INNOVATIO IP VENTURES, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-09308 (N.D. Ill. 2013), Dkt. No. 975. court calculated FRAND royalty (cap) of WiFi SEPs using the average profit margin of the WiFi chips that cover all the implemented features of the WiFi standard in the infringing products. Then, the court calculated FRAND royalty by multiplying the average profit margin to the contribution of patentee’s SEPs to the profit and pro rata share of patentee’s SEPs to the total number of WiFi SEPs providing similar contribution to the profit. Thus, LTE FRAND royalty can be evaluated as (average profit margin to the contribution of patentee’s SEPs) x (net profit of relating products) x (pro rata share of patentee’s SEPs to the total number of LTE SEPs providing similar contribution to the profit). For example evaluation of LTE royalty for a specific SEPs owner, please see How much will Apple need to pay to Ericsson for a reasonable licensing royalty of LTE patents?.

          In response to the courts’ determination of FRAND Royalty, major SEPs owners such as Qualcomm, Nokia, Ericsson expressed their serious concerns about courts’ ruling to diminish the value of SEPs. Qualcomm insisted that there is nothing wrong with the licensing practice of using the price of the entire end product as the appropriate royalty base, because licensing at the end user device level has been an industry custom in the telecommunications sector.  By the telecommunications industry custom, Qualcomm explained that patentees of SEPs usually did not enforce licensing obligation to component manufactures. Therefore, FRAND royalty base cannot be the smallest saleable component that embodies the relevant SEPs.

Additionally, Qualcomm reasoned that the contribution of the patented feature to consumer demand should not be limited to components of devices because extended consumers’ benefits are coming from the services provided by the network connecting devices.  Therefore, the smallest saleable component that embodies the relevant SEPs is actually the device itself in the telecommunications sector.  Furthermore, developing standard technology in mobile telecommunications is a high-risk business.  Thus, without strong patent protection and return for R&D, there will be no encouragement for further investment in telecommunications standards.  Consequently, artificially diminished royalties on mobile telecommunications standard-compatible products will impede innovation, and thus, harm to the industry and consumers ultimately.     

         

On the other hand, Cisco, HP, Microsoft and several other IT companies argued that the use of the entire market value as a royalty base should not be used unless all of the profit of the infringing product is attributed to the features of SEPs.  Thus, the value of SEPs should be determined by apportion to the contribution actually the patented features made to the accused product.  They also insisted that patentees bear the burden of proof for the value of SEPs.

A method to resolve disagreement about FRAND royalty base may be a hybrid approach to royalty base that was suggested by the 3G licensing platform.  The 3G licensing platform, which is the licensing organization for 3G mobile SEPs, adopted reference market value of the entire product as a royalty base, if the product consists of several functional blocks.  For example, if the product performs 3G mobile communication and other functions that give values to the users of the product, the royalty base only take into account the value proportional to the 3G mobile communication function embedded in the entire product.  Thus, if a mobile phone of price T includes a component of price A for mobile communication function and other components of price B for other independent functions and multiple components of price C for common functions supporting both mobile communication function and other independent functions, FRAND royalty base for mobile communication is A in the smallest saleable component approach and T in the entire market approach. In the hybrid approach to FRAND royalty, however, FRAND royalty base for mobile communication is A + C x [A/(A+B)] taking into account the net contribution of the multiple components for common functions to mobile communication.  Consequently, FRAND royalty base is a compromise value between the two extremes such that it is the entire product value including only the smallest saleable function contributed by the patented feature of a SEP.

©2015 TechIPm, LLC All Rights Reserved http://www.techipm.com/

LG’s LTE Standard Patents Acquisition by NPEs: Potential Litigation Risks?

TechIPm’s research for the patents relate to the 4G LTE standard found increasing acquisition of LG’s LTE standard related patents by patent monetizing NPEs. LTE patents analysis for the market leaders among LTE UE (cellular phones, smart phones, PDAs, mobile PCs, etc.) and base station (eNB) product manufactures and innovators as of June 30, 2015 identified that many patent monetizing NPEs acquired total of 110 key patents for the LTE standard from several major IPR holders (for the details regarding the patent analysis, please visit http://www.techipm.com/alexdb/4G%20LTE%20Patents%20for%20Standards%20Data%201Q%202015_Intro.pdf).

Among the total of 110 key patents for the LTE standard acquired by patent monetizing NPEs, LG accounts for 57% (followed by Ericsson (19%) and Panasonic (11%)). As of 2Q 2015, LG is the top IPR holders for the LTE standard related patents in the US (accounts for 13% of 1700 patents followed by Samsung (12%) and Qualcomm (11%)). Among the NPEs that acquired patents for the LTE standard, Optis Cellular Technology accounts for 51% followed by Evolved Wireless (11%) and Thomson Licensing (9%).

Considering the recent increasing monetization activities involving patent infringement lawsuits exploiting LTE patents (for details, please visit http://techipm-innovationfrontline.blogspot.com/2015/04/increasing-monetization-activities.html) it is expected that the acquired LG’s LTE standard related patents can be the potential patent litigation risks for the LTE related industry (Smartphone, Connected Car, Wearable/IoT devices etc.),

Recently, Evolved Wireless has filed patent infringement lawsuits against Apple, Samsung, Microsoft, HTC and Lenovo ((Evolved Wireless v. Samsung Complaint:  http://www.slideshare.net/alexglee/evolve-wiress-lg-v-samsung-lte-standard-patents) exploiting five LG’s LTE standard related patents (7,746,916, 7,768,965, 7,809,373, 7,881,236, and 8,218,481). Another potential litigation risk will be the acquisition of LG's patents by Optis Wireless Technology. Optis Wireless Technology sued ZTE exploiting the LTE patents acquired from Panasonic.

For more information, please contact Alex Lee at alexglee@techipm.com.

©2015 TechIPm, LLC 

All Rights Reserved http://www.techipm.com/

The U.S. Holds IPR Leadership in Patents for Wireless Standards

To evaluate the IPR leadership in wireless communications, the US patents that are related to the key wireless standards are analyzed.  The wireless patens are grouped by mobile wireless communications (4G LTE) related patents and fixed wireless communications (WLAN, WPAN, NFC) related patents.  Patent disclosures in claims and detail description for each patent are analyzed as to whether the contents are within the scope of key standard specifications (3GPP, IEEE, ISO, NFC Forum).  Top 20 patent holders for each group are then selected to rank the combined IPR shares.  For details about the analysis, please refer “Wireless Patents for Standards & Applications 1Q 2015” (http://www.slideshare.net/alexglee/wireless-patents-for-standards-applications-1q-2015).

For the mobile wireless communications IPR, LG Electronics is the leader followed by Samsung Electronics, Qualcomm, Google, Ericsson, Nokia, Apple, InterDigital, BlackBerry and Panasonic. For the fixed wireless communications IPR, Sony is the leader followed by Intel, Marvell, Samsung Electronics, Qualcomm, Broadcom, Cisco, NXP, Philips and Texas Instruments. Combining the mobile and fixed wireless communications IPR, Samsung Electronics is the leader followed by LG Electronics, Qualcomm, Intel, Sony, Nokia, Google, Ericsson, Marvell and InterDigital.

The combined IPR shares for the top 20 IPR holder’s countries based on the location of headquarter show that the U.S. holds IPR leadership in patents for the key wireless standards.

For more information, please contact Alex Lee at alexglee@techipm.com

©2015 TechIPm, LLC All Rights Reserved

http://www.techipm.com/

LTE patent pool accounts for around 10% of LTE standard essential patents IPR share in the US

Google announced addition of its LTE patents acquired from Motorola Mobility to Via Licensing's LTE Patent Pool (Ref. http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/04/09/google-joins-wireless-patent-group/25478395/). Via Licensing's LTE Patent Pool Licensors are AT&T, China Mobile, Clear Wireless, Deutsche Telekom, DTVG Licensing, Google, Hewlett-Packard, KDDI, NTT DOCOMO, SK Telecom, Telecom Italia, Telefonica, ZTE. Before the joining of Google, ZTE was only the LTE smartphone manufacture among LTE Patent Pool Licensors.

In recent TechIPm, LLC’s 4G LTE standard essential patents research for the US market leader among 4G LTE UE (cellular phones, smart phones, PDAs, mobile PCs, etc.) and base station (eNB) product manufactures and innovators  (Ref. http://techipm-innovationfrontline.blogspot.com/2015/01/4g-lte-patents-for-standard_8.html), Google ranked 6th in IPR share for 4G LTE standard essential patent candidates as of 1Q 2014. By the addition of Google as its licensors, Via Licensing's LTE patent pool now accounts for around 10% of LTE standard essential patents IPR share in the US.

For more information, please contact Alex Lee at alexglee@techipm.com .

©2015 TechIPm, LLC All Rights Reserved

http://www.techipm.com/

Increasing Monetization Activities Exploiting LTE Patents

Recent TechIPm’s research for patents relate to 4G LTE standard found increasing monetization activities exploiting LTE standard related patents.  LTE patents analysis for the market leaders among LTE UE (cellular phones, smart phones, PDAs, mobile PCs, etc.) and base station (eNB) product manufactures and innovators identified more than 1600 issued patents hold by 42 entities in the US as of March 31, 2015 (ref. http://www.techipm.com/alexdb/4G%20LTE%20Patents%20for%20Standards%20Data%201Q%202015_Intro.pdf  ).

Among 42 LTE patents holders, NPE accounts for 11% IPR share of LTE standard related patents. Identified NPE IPR shareholders are Adaptix, ETRI, InterDigital, Innovative Sonic, Inventergy, IPR Licensing, ITRI, Optis Wireless Technology, Seoul National University, Thomson Licensing and UPIP. Recent monetization activities exploiting LTE patents among NPE shareholders are as follows.

Adaptix, a subsidiary of Acacia Research, sued several telecom operators including AT&T and smartphone manufactures including HTC for infringement of its 4G LTE patents (ref. http://www.law360.com/articles/616031/adaptix-ramps-up-at-t-htc-patent-feud-despite-setback ). Adaptix entered into patent license agreements with several entities including NEC as settlements for patent dispute (ref. http://finance.yahoo.com/news/acacia-subsidiary-resolves-action-nec-105900394.html ).

InterDigital sued several smartphone manufactures including Nokia for infringement of its 4G LTE patents and entered into patent license agreement with Samsung as a settlement for patent dispute (ref. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2359140/samsung-signs-cellular-patent-deal-with-interdigital-ending-all-litigation.html ).

UPIP sued several smartphone manufactures including Huawei for infringement of its 4G LTE patents in Germany and the UK (Ref. http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140310005655/en/Unwired-Planet-Announces-Enforcement-Action-Germany-United#.VR6pAfnF-HA ).

Recently, Optis Wireless Technology sued ZTE for infringement of its 4G LTE patents acquired from Panasonic (Ref. http://www.rfcexpress.com/lawsuits/patent-lawsuits/texas-eastern-district-court/949460/optis-wireless-technology-llc-et-al-v-zte-corporation-et-al/summary/ ).

Inventergy is actively operating its licensing program exploiting its 4G LTE patents acquired from Panasonic (Ref. http://www.marketwatch.com/story/inventergy-launches-standardized-licensing-initiative-for-mobile-device-manufacturers-2015-03-09 ).

In addition to NPE IPR holders, Ericsson and Nokia (both entities are accounts for 13% IPR share of LTE standard related patents) are actively involved in monetization exploiting LTE patents:

Ericsson sued Samsung for infringement of its 4G LTE patents and entered into patent license agreements with Samsung as a settlement for patent dispute (Ref. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/27/us-ericsson-samsung-patents-idUSBREA0Q0A120140127 ). Ericsson also sued Apple for infringement of its 4G LTE patents (Ref. http://www.cellular-news.com/story/Legal/67300.php ). Licensing royalty of Ericsson that can have from Apple is expected to be around $200 M per year (Ref. http://techipm-innovationfrontline.blogspot.com/2015/03/how-much-will-apple-need-to-pay-to.html ).

Nokia sued HTC for infringement of its 4G LTE patents and entered into patent license agreements with HTC as a settlement for patent dispute (Ref. http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2327794/htc-and-nokia-end-legal-spat-with-patents-agreement ).

For more information, please contact Alex Lee at alexglee@techipm.com .

©2015 TechIPm, LLC All Rights Reserved

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4G LTE, 5G M2M/IoT, Smartphone NFC Patents for Standards & Applications Data 1Q 2015

TechIPm (http://www.techipm.com) has announced the addition of the "4G LTE Patents for Standards Data 1Q 2015," "M2M & D2D Patents for IoT Data 1Q 2015," and "NFC Patents for Standards & Applications Data 1Q 2015" to its offering.

TechIPm’s patents research data are very useful information for the patent licensing royalty & litigation damage estimation, patent investment feasibility analysis, competitive intelligence, R&D planning and strategic patent development.

4G LTE Patents for Standards Data 1Q 2015 is a custom research based on 4G LTE patents analysis for the market leaders among LTE UE (cellular phones, smart phones, PDAs, mobile PCs, etc.) and base station (eNB) product manufactures and innovators. To evaluate the essentiality of a patent for the LTE-Advanced standard, patent disclosures in claims and detail description for each 4G LTE related patent are compared to the final versions of the 3GPP Release 10 technical specifications for the LTE RAN (Radio Access Network). Assignee name, patent number (USPTO & EPO Families hyperlinked to Google Patent), standard specifications series & section number, technology category, and essentiality level for more than 1600 issued patents are provided in the data.

For more information visit http://www.techipm.com/alexdb/4G%20LTE%20Patents%20for%20Standards%20Data%201Q%202015_Intro.pdf

M2M & D2D communication technologies are the key enablers for emerging IoT (Internet of Things) applications and considered as the essential components of 5G mobile communication. M2M & D2D Patents for IoT Data 1Q 2015 is a custom research based on patents analysis for the market leaders among M2M & D2D product manufactures and service providers. Patent disclosures in claims and detail description for each patent are analyzed as to whether the contents are within the scope of key technologies for M2M (e.g. low power design & management) and D2D (e.g. discovery process) communications.  Assignee name, patent/publication number, hyperlink to Google Patent technology category, title, abstract, and application date for more than 1300 patent applications are provided in the data.

For more information visit http://www.techipm.com/alexdb/M2M%20&%20D2D%20Patents%20for%20IoT%20Data%201Q%202015_Intro.pdf

NFC Patents for Standards & Applications Data 1Q 2015 is a custom research based on NFC related patents analysis for the market leaders among NFC product manufactures and service providers. NFC patents are classified by industry standard for NFC technology (ISO and NFC Forum) and major NFC applications. Assignee name, patent number (USPTO & EPO Families hyperlinked to Google Patent), applications, and standard specifications series & section number for more than 600 issued patents are provided in the data.

For more information visit

http://www.techipm.com/alexdb/NFC%20Patents%20for%20Standards%20&%20Applications%20Data%201Q%202015_Intro.pdf

Contacts

Alex G. Lee, Principal

TechIPm, LLC

alexglee@techipm.com